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In reply to Hartelius’s (2016) response to my paper “From Philosophy to Phenomenology: The 
Argument for a ‘Soft’ Perennialism” (Taylor, 2016a), I provide arguments in support of my 
model from contemporary scholars of mysticism, who advocate a move from a philosophically-
based perennialism to a phenomenologically-based essentialism. This discussion illustrates 
that perennialist perspectives are far from outmoded. I discuss the metaphysical aspects of my 
model, suggesting that there is no reason why transpersonal psychology should not address 
metaphysical issues, as long as they are secondary to phenomenological issues, and as long 
as they are based on evidence rather than wholly speculative. Attempts to exclude so-called 
non-scientific phenomena from transpersonal psychology are based on invalid arguments, 
including an outmoded concept of the importance of falsifiability. I argue that attempts to 
explain the commonalities in accounts of spiritual or mystical experiences across and outside 
traditions through radical diffusionism, contextualism, or neuroscientific reductionism are 
inadequate. I note that these commonalities also feature in accounts of near-death experiences 
and accounts of intense post-traumatic growth. I also highlight the importance of historical 
cases of natural wakefulness in individuals with no familiarity with spiritual traditions. I 
conclude with comments on the nature of recent debates in transpersonal psychology and 
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Part of the purpose of this article is to respond to the criticisms that Hartelius (2016) has made of my soft perennialism model (as presented in 
Taylor, 2016a). At the same time, the paper will explore 
further aspects and ramifications of my model, and its 
relationship to contemporary perspectives in the study 
of mystical experiences. In the process, I aim to present 
a case for an essentialist—rather than contextualist—
interpretation of expansive states of being as they occur 
both within and outside spiritual traditions. In addition, 
I would like to address wider issues relating to the field 
of transpersonal psychology, including its relationship to 
metaphysics and science.
        I will begin with a brief summary of my model. 
The basic aim of Taylor (2016a) was to argue that 
transpersonal theorists such as Hartelius and Ferrer 
(e.g., 2013) have been too ready to dismiss a perennialist 
perspective that suggests that the transformational 
processes and mystical experiences described across 
spiritual traditions share certain essential features. In 
Taylor (2016a) I highlighted seven common themes in 
the depictions of the process of “spiritual awakening” 
across various traditions. These are: (1) increasing 
and intensifying awareness; (2) a movement beyond 
separateness and towards connection and union; (3) 
cultivating inner stillness and emptiness; (4) developing 
increased inner stability, self-sufficiency, and equanimity; 
(5) a movement towards increased empathy, compassion, 
and altruism; (6) the relinquishing of personal agency; 
and (7) a movement towards enhanced well-being. 
My own research has suggested that when spiritual 
awakening occurs outside the context of spiritual 
traditions, the same themes and trends emerge. This 
implies that there is a common psychological landscape 
of expansive experience which is interpreted in different 
ways across spiritual traditions, and outside them. 
        In view of this, I suggested, some form 
of perennialism is necessary, and I put forward a 
https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.75
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 model of soft perennialism that is different from 
traditional perennialism in a number of significant 
ways. For example, soft perennialism is primarily 
phenomenological rather than philosophical; it does not 
posit an end point to spiritual development; it does not 
speak in terms of rigid, pre-given structures of spiritual 
development (as does Wilber’s model, for example); 
and it is not based on a concept of a transcendent other 
but includes the experience of an immanent and all-
pervading spiritual force. In contemplative or mystical 
traditions associated with monotheistic religions, this 
all-pervading spiritual force may be conceptualized in 
theistic terms, while in other systems it may become 
conceptualized as fundamental spiritual principles such 
as brahman, tao, or dharmakaya.
        In Taylor (2016a) I advocated a more 
phenomenological approach, focused on experiences that 
occurred outside the context of spiritual traditions and 
practices, suggesting that transpersonal psychology has 
traditionally been too oriented around spiritual traditions 
and practices (Taylor, 2016a). This form of perennialism 
has some commonalities with Ferrer’s participatory 
philosophy, as acknowledged by Ferrer (2017). (Indeed, 
Ferrer has suggested the term participatory perennialism 
as an alternative to soft perennialism.) In fact, one of my 
initial motivations in formulating the model was to try 
to establish some common ground between perennial 
and participatory perspectives. 1
        My model could equally be seen as a form of 
essentialism. Some scholars have used perennialism and 
essentialism interchangeably (for example, Hollenback, 
1996; Dible, 2010), but others—such as Almond 
(1988), Marshall (2005), and Rose (2016)—have seen 
perennialism and essentialism as distinct. According to 
this view, essentialism emphasizes the commonalities 
amongst mystical or spiritual experiences and practices 
in different traditions (as soft perennialism does) whereas 
perennialism refers to the claim that there is a common 
core of basic teachings across religious traditions, and so 
relates more strongly to the philosophical and conceptual 
frameworks of traditions. In other words, essentialism 
is more experientially or phenomenologically oriented, 
while perennialism is more philosophically oriented. 
Thus, Rose (2016) has associated perennialism with 
“religious doctrines and symbolism” and essentialism 
with “contemplative experiences” (p. 4). While as 
Marshall (2014) has put it, “mystical essentialists, unlike 
mystical perennialists (the two are often confused, but it 
is important to make the distinction,) do not insist on a 
common core of teachings across traditions" (p. 7).
        In these terms, my model is certainly more akin
to essentialism than perennialism. In fact, in the original 
paper I could have used the term essentialist phenomenology 
rather than perennial phenomenology to emphasise the 
shift from a focus on doctrine and teachings (as in the 
perennial philosophy) to a focus on experience (as in an 
essentialist phenomenology). Essentialism can be seen as 
the evidential basis of perennialism, and it is the evidential 
aspects that I wish to focus on.
        In the original paper, I used the metaphor of a 
psychological landscape that is viewed and interpreted 
in different ways by people who explore different aspects 
of it, and look at it from different perspectives. That 
is, the experiential landscape of expansive states of 
being can be interpreted in different ways according 
to different cultural and philosophical perspectives—
and also according to different individual personality 
traits or tendencies. The question of ontology is not so 
significant—the important point is that these expansive 
ranges are part of human beings’ collective and potential 
psychological experience.
        My analogy is very close to the one used by 
James (1986), who described mystical experiences as 
“windows through which the mind looks out upon a 
more extensive and inclusive world. The difference of the 
views seen from the different mystical windows need not 
prevent us from entertaining this supposition” (p. 428). 
James was clear that this “wider world of meanings” 
contains a great deal of variety—in his words “a mixed 
constitution like that of this world” (p. 428)—and hence 
a great range of perspectives and interpretations.
Contemporary Perennial 
and Essentialist Perspectives
One of Hartelius’s criticisms was that my paper was too reliant on a small number of sources whom I 
chose because they supported my arguments. In this way, 
he accused me of unscholarly practice, drawing parallels 
with Wilber’s unscholarly practice of misusing sources 
and Blackstone’s of using uncritical interpretation of 
textual material (Hartelius, 2016). This is the "cherry 
picking" argument that is often used when academics 
or scientists use sources to justify a pre-formed theory.
        I believe that Hartelius’s criticism has validity 
in the sense that I was too reliant upon a small range of 
classic or well-established sources of mystical scholarship 
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(such as Underhill, 1911/1960; Spencer, 1963; Stace, 
1964; Scharfstein, 1973; Happold, 1986; Forman, 1999). 
So what I would like to do in this response is to broaden 
my discussion to include some more contemporary 
sources. These sources show that perennialism (or 
essentialism) is far from an outmoded concept in the 
contemporary study of contemplative traditions and 
mystical experiences, and also that there has been a 
general shift towards a more phenomenological approach 
in the study of mystical experiences, along the same lines 
as my suggestion of moving from a perennial philosophy 
to a perennial (or essentialist) phenomenology. I do not 
intend to suggest that perennialism is now the consensus 
view, but simply to show that perennial perspectives are 
prevalent in contemporary scholarship, and that these 
lend support to my soft perennialist outlook.
        There are many contemporary scholars of 
mysticism who have emphasized the commonalities 
within contemplative traditions and suggested—in 
a similar way to Taylor (2016a)—that this is due to a 
shared domain of experience (not of teachings) which 
underlies different conceptions and interpretations. 
For example, Rose (2016) has highlighted a number 
of “contemplative universals” within the meditative 
experience of different traditions. Specifically comparing 
what might be considered the meditative manuals of 
Theravada Buddhism, Patañjali Yoga, and Catholic 
mystical theology, he has found that the commonalities 
are so striking that they point to a “religion-neutral 
spiritual itinerary constituted by a repeatable and 
invariant progression of experiential states” (Rose, 
2016, p. 4). Rose has found that there are “virtually 
identical sets of mystical experience that are induced by 
the deepening concentration" in each of these traditions 
even though they are associated with “distinct and 
doctrinally irreconcilable religious systems” (p. 3). 
Favoring a phenomenological approach (as I do,) he has 
attempted to move away from a perennialism based on 
“elusive common doctrines” (what I would refer to as 
hard perennialism) towards a more phenomenologically-
oriented essentialism, where it is possible to find a 
“universally plausible common ground” (p. 4). Rose has 
found it possible to adopt what he has called apophatic 
pluralism without advocating contextualism. He has 
taken evidence for contemplative universals from modern 
scientific fields such as neurology—for example, the fact 
that brain scans show similar patterns of neurological 
activity amongst contemplatives of different traditions.
        Studstill (2005) has also argued for a great deal 
of commonality amongst the transformative processes 
experienced by mystics across a variety of traditions. 
He has particularly highlighted the commonalities 
between Tibetan Buddhist Dzogchen teachings and the 
medieval German mysticism of Meister Eckhart, Suso, 
and Tauler, showing how the superficially different 
aspects of these traditions are reconciled within the 
essential unity of mystical traditions. Adopting a 
systems theory approach to mystical experience, he has 
explained how different mystical practices “disrupt the 
processes of mind that maintain ordinary, egocentric 
experience and induce a structural transformation of 
consciousness” (Studstill, 2005, p. 6). He has described 
the transformation that ensues in a similar way to Taylor 
(2016a), in terms expansion and enhancement:
The essential characteristic of this transformation 
is an increasingly sensitized awareness/knowledge 
of Reality that manifests as (among other things) 
an enhanced sense of emotional well-being, an 
expanded locus of concern engendering greater 
compassion for others, an enhanced capacity to 
creatively negotiate one’s environment, and a greater 
capacity for aesthetic appreciation. (Studstill, 2005, 
p. 7)
Nevertheless, Studstill’s (2005) mystical pluralism—as 
he has referred to his model—has a great deal of room 
for variety, as its name suggests. Although Studstill 
has allowed for "an unconditioned, unmediated 
experience of the Real” (p. 26) he has also accepted 
that most experiences are conceptually mediated to 
some extent.. Thus, he has advocated a “moderate 
form of constructivism,” at the same as holding that 
“unmediated experience is possible” (p. 20).
        Another contemporary scholar sympathetic 
to essentialism is Marshall (2005, 2014), who has 
emphasized both the commonalities and differences 
across spiritual traditions. In his investigations into 
the metaphysical implications of mystical experience, 
Marshall has favored a form of essentialism that 
he has termed mystical aspectism whilst recognizing 
contributions from context and biology to mystical 
phenomenology. In Taylor (2016a), I noted that an all-
pervading spiritual force is frequently depicted as having 
qualities of radiance, such as when, in the Upanishads 
and the Bhagavad-Gita, brahman is compared to the 
sun. Marshall (2014) has also highlighted this feature:
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The language of light that is a common feature of 
emanative metaphysics, expressive of the outflow 
of creation from its source and of mystical return 
to that source … is probably more than symbolism 
based on universal familiarity with the life-giving 
sun, for special experiences of luminosity are a 
very common, cross-cultural feature of mystical 
experience. (p. 6)
 Marshall (2014) has been critical of the “radical 
contextualists [who] asserted that mystical experiences 
are thoroughly conditioned by their religious contexts” 
(p. 10). He has suggested that their conclusions are not 
based on the phenomenological evidence of clear-cut 
mystical testimonies, but on “abstract mystical ideas and 
metaphysics, for which experiential sources are often 
unclear or not at all visible” (p. 10).
Quantitative Research
However, some of the strongest contemporary evidence for a perennialist or essentialist perspective 
stems from Hood (1975) and the cross-traditional 
studies using his psychometric “mysticism-scale” 
(M-scale). For example, a study by Streib and Hood 
(2013) found that spiritual but not religious individuals 
shared fundamentally similar experiences without being 
attached to any particular religion or tradition, suggesting 
that there is an underlying experience which is expressed 
through spirituality, irrespective of a person’s religious 
orientation (if any). Similarly, a study by Chen, Qi, 
Hood, and Watson (2011a) explored the phenomenology 
of the mystical experiences of 139 Buddhist monks and 
nuns, using thematic coding and statistical analysis. 
Confirmatory factor analysis supported Hood’s thesis 
that “the phenomenology of mystical experience reveals 
a common experiential core that can be discerned across 
religious and spiritual traditions” (p. 654). That is, the 
experiences of these Buddhist practitioners corresponded 
closely to previous findings with individuals associated 
with other traditions. A study of the experiences of 
Tibetan Buddhist monks (Chen, Hood, Yang, & 
Watson, 2011b) had very similar findings.
        As Hood (2006) stated, “psychometric and 
empirical evidence for the common core thesis is 
substantial and continues to accumulate” (p. 1). This 
evidence suggests that the same core characteristics of 
mystical experiences occur no matter what religious or 
spiritual tradition a person is affiliated with, and even 
when they are not affiliated with any tradition. As stated 
in my original paper (Taylor, 2016a), expansive states of 
being often occur with many of the same characteristics 
both within and without spiritual traditions.     
        Partly inspired by Hood’s M-Scale, I and my 
co-researchers Kilrea and Bilodeau (St. Paul University, 
Ottawa, Canada) recently developed a scale that attempts 
to test for an ongoing state of wakefulness (rather than 
temporary experiences, such as Hood’s), entitled the 
“Inventory of Secular/Spiritual Wakefulness” (Kilrea & 
Taylor, 2016; Taylor, 2017). Through two pilot studies, 
and with the aid of several consultants with relevant 
expertise, the study was rigorously tested for content 
validity, construct validity, and internal consistency 
reliability, until a final scale containing 28 items emerged, 
with a high degree of reliability and validity. The items 
of the scale related to a variety of characteristics that 
previous research had associated with the construct of 
wakefulness, including perceptual characteristics such as 
intensified perception and increased presentness, affective 
characteristics such as increased sense of connection 
and reduced identification with thoughts and mental 
constructs, conceptual characteristics such as decreased 
sense of group identity and increased inner security, and 
finally behavioral characteristics such as the relishing of 
inactivity and reduced interest in materialism (Kilrea & 
Taylor, 2016; Taylor, 2017).
        The scale was tested further with a group of 
291 individuals from the general population, and 30 
individuals who belonged to a hypothetically awakened 
group, most of whom were not associated with any 
particular spiritual tradition. Scores of the awakening 
group were significantly higher than those of the general 
group, showing statistically significant differences 
(Kilrea & Taylor, 2016; Taylor, 2017). This research is in 
its initial stages, so limited conclusions should be drawn, 
and there are potential issues of circularity, which further 
applications of the scale may potentially clarify. (A paper 
detailing the development and initial testing of the scale 
is presently in preparation. Further testing of the scale is 
also being conducted.)
A New Day for Perennialism?
This list of contemporary scholars of mysticism who are sympathetic to forms of perennialism or 
essentialism could easily be extended. For example, 
Sarbacker (2005) has also advocated an anthropological 
and phenomenological approach rather than an 
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ontological or theological one. Brainard (2000), Saso 
(2015), and de Castro (2015, 2017) have also advocated 
perennialist or essentialist perspectives.           
        It appears that, to some extent at least, there is 
a return to perennialist or essentialist perspectives. Rose 
(2016) has actually spoken of a “new day for perennialism” 
(p. 1) and the “recovery of mystical essentialism” (p. 4) 
after the notion had become unfashionable with the 
popularity of Katz’s (1978) “radical contextualism.” Rose 
has described a “return to the nomothetic—universalising 
and essentialising—explanatory approaches to the study 
of religions and mystics” and a “new boldness in moving 
beyond constructivism towards essentialism amongst 
mystical scholars” (p. 4).
        This is not to say that perennialism or essentialist 
perspectives are now dominant. The debate between 
contextualism and essentialism continues. There are also 
approaches that see both perspectives as problematic. For 
example, Taves (2009) has developed an attributionist 
approach as an alternative to both contextualism and 
essentialism. She has suggested that experiences only 
become religious or mystical when they are deemed as 
such; that is, when special or unusual experiences are 
attributed with a religious meaning. Komarovski (2015) 
has suggested that constructivist or essentialist models are 
Eurocentric and incompatible with the schemas of Tibetan 
Buddhism, and that the debate should shift to the processes 
and techniques that induce the experiences, rather than the 
experiences themselves. Ferrer’s  (2002, 2017) participatory 
philosophy could also be seen as an attempt to move 
beyond both perennialism and contextualism.
        However, it is important to be aware that 
contemporary perennial perspectives have become more 
nuanced and sophisticated, emphasizing similarities and 
differences—as well as assimilating contemporary fields 
and theories such as systems theory and neuroscience—
and including biological, contextualist, and pluralistic 
elements. There is a general recognition that earlier 
forms of perennialism (such as those espoused by 
Huxley [1945] or Schuon [1984]) were too simplistic, 
glossing over plurality in their zest to find unanimity. 
Again, one of the most significant aspects of this in 
relation to Taylor (2016a) is the movement away from 
the philosophical aspects (that is, a focus on doctrines) 
towards a more phenomenological approach (that is, 
a focus on experience) in keeping with the distinction 
between a perennial philosophy and a perennial (or 
essentialist) phenomenology.
        In other words, the rejection of perennialism by 
some contemporary transpersonal psychologists appears 
not to take account of—and to be out of step with—
contemporary debates in studies of mysticism and religion. 
The perennialism depicted and rejected by, for example, 
Hartelius (2015) and Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) is in 
many respects a proverbial straw man of unsophisticated 
early perennialism, centered around Wilber’s simplistic 
structuralist perennialism or the traditional perennialism 
of Huxley (1945) and Schuon (1984). In the critique of the 
perennial philosophy in Hartelius and Ferrer (2013), for 
example, no reference is made to any of the contemporary 
more nuanced and phenomenologically oriented forms of 
perennialism I have outlined above.
        In any case, Hartelius and Ferrer’s (2013) 
statement that, “the more closely accounts from different 
mystical traditions are compared, the more they can be 
seen to differ” (p. 190) seems extremely dubious. This 
may perhaps apply to doctrines and beliefs, but it is hard 
to see how it could apply to accounts or experiences (that 
is, in the most accurate use of these terms, it might be 
true in a perennialist sense, but not in essentialist one). 
Hartelius and Ferrer (2013) have apparently made the 
same error that essentialists accused Katz (1978) of—that 
is, of comparing teachings rather than actual accounts 
(Forman, 1999; Marshall, 2005).  
Alternative Explanations 
for Commonalities
Of course, it is possible to accept that commonalities exist and attempt to explain them in other ways 
besides perennialism or essentialism. However, radical 
diffusionist explanations (that is, the attempt to explain 
all commonalities in terms of diffusion, without 
recognizing other possible contributions, including 
experiential) appear highly implausible. If there was a 
chain of influence in the way this argument suggests, 
surely accounts of experiences would have altered 
beyond recognition over centuries of dissipation (as in 
the game of Telephone) rather than remaining similar. 
(This is in addition to a lack of evidence of significant 
cultural contact, as argued by Marshall [2014].)  And of 
course, when one considers that such experiences occur 
not just in the context of spiritual traditions, but in a 
secular context amongst individuals who do not have 
any grounding in spiritual traditions (and who live in 
cultures without overt expression of spirituality) then the 
concept of diffusion makes no sense at all.
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        In his response paper, Hartelius (2016) actually 
contradicted the previously quoted assertion (that “the 
more closely accounts from different mystical traditions 
are compared, the more they can be seen to differ,” 
[Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013, p. 190]) by acknowledging 
that similarities exist, but suggesting that their existence 
can be explained in terms of the biological and 
psychological correspondences amongst human beings. 
As he wrote, “humans share quite similar DNA and 
physiology. An explanation that relies on neuroscience 
and phenomenology rather than on belief in some sort 
of pervasive consciousness that is claimed to be the 
basis of all existence, seems both more parsimonious 
and more credible” (p. 43). Hartelius illustrated this 
with the example of falling in love. However, if mystical 
experiences are rooted in neurology or DNA, then 
one would surely expect them to be more common, 
in the same way that the experience of falling in love 
is common. But of course, mystical experiences occur 
infrequently, and it appears that only a tiny minority 
of human beings experience an expansive state of being 
(equivalent to spiritual awakening) as their normal state. 
Surveys of spiritual and mystical experiences have found 
that between a third and a half of individuals have 
had them, and in most cases just once (for example, 
Greeley, 1975; Hay & Heald, 1987). What would be the 
neurological or biological basis of an experience which 
most people have apparently never had?
        Another problematic aspect of the linking of 
awakening experiences to neurology is that it appears 
to be a form of what Marshall (2014) has described 
as “neuroscientific reductionism,” the tendency to 
explain mystical experiences in terms of “common 
neurobiological and psychological mechanisms” (p. 11). 
There are many arguments here, but I will highlight 
three. Firstly, in a general sense, there is the difficulty 
of explaining any conscious experience as causally 
connected to neurological mechanisms. The problematic 
nature of this has been highlighted by many scholars 
(for example, Chalmers, 1996; Kelly et al., 2007; Tallis, 
2011; Nagel, 2012). In the language of the philosophy of 
consciousness, this relates to the so called hard problem 
(highlighted by Chalmers, 1996) of explaining how the 
soggy lump of matter of the brain can give rise to the 
amazing richness and variety of subjective experience. 
So, in specific relation to awakening experiences, how is 
it possible to explain such rich and intense experiences 
in terms of greater or lesser activity in certain parts 
of the brain, or in terms of the activities of certain 
neurotransmitters or hormones? In McGinn’s (1989) 
analogy, this would be as miraculous as turning water 
into wine.
        Secondly, neuroscience has yet to establish any 
reliable or consistent correspondence between specific 
mental states and specific patterns of neurological activity, 
which one would expect if the latter produced the former. 
As Kastrup (2014) has stated, “Empirical observations 
reveal an inconsistent and even contradictory relationship 
between subjective experience and measurable parameters 
of neural processes” (p. 33). This is also evident from 
the lack of a clear relationship between brain states and 
psychological conditions such as depression or ADHD, 
and the lack of evidence for a significant benefit of 
drugs designed to increase the brain’s serotonin uptake 
(or to change the activity of the neurotransmitters 
supposedly associated with ADHD; Healy, 2015). 
Finally, phenomena such as near-death experiences (when 
subjective experience seems to continue when the brain 
is clinically dead) and terminal lucidity (when people 
with severe brain damage experience a return to normal 
consciousness shortly before death) also argue against a 
straightforward link between neurology and conscious 
experience (Kelly et al., 2007).
Further Arguments in Favor of Essentialism
In Taylor (2016a), to support my argument that there is an experiential landscape of more expansive and 
intensified awareness (equivalent to different degrees 
of wakefulness) that precedes interpretation and 
conceptualization by different spiritual traditions, I 
drew on my research into awakening experiences, and 
ongoing states of wakefulness, suggesting that essentially 
the same characteristics occurred as those highlighted by 
spiritual traditions. Another important piece of evidence 
here (not emphasized in my original article for reasons 
of space) is the many historical examples of individuals 
who experienced ongoing expansive states of being (or 
wakefulness) without being associated with spiritual 
traditions, or even having any real knowledge of spiritual 
practices and paths. Many of these examples are discussed 
in Taylor (2017), including the poets D. H. Lawrence, 
William Wordsworth, and Walt Whitman, and figures 
such as the nature writer Richard Jefferies and the idealist 
and social activist Peace Pilgrim.2
        Such examples provide very strong evidence 
against the radical contextualist position. Katz (1978) 
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has commented on how the mystic-to-be grows up in 
an environment full of “images, concepts, symbols, 
ideological values, and ritual behavior” (p. 33) with 
mystical teachings appearing at a later stage. But this is 
manifestly not true in the case of mystics—and many 
of those who have temporary mystical experiences—who 
grow up outside the context of religion and spirituality, 
in secular cultures without overt knowledge or support 
of spirituality.3     
        It is also worth noting that secular awakenings 
and the similarities of cross-traditional experiences are 
not the only arguments against contextualism. Three 
other problematic issues—summarized in Marshall 
(2005)—are (1) the disparity between experience and 
content (that is, mystical experiences often diverge from 
the contexts and concepts of the traditions they are 
associated with); (2) difficulty of expression (that is, if 
mystical experiences are constructs of the traditions they 
are associated with, surely it should be easy to describe 
them with reference to the concepts to these traditions—
but of course, the opposite is frequently the case); and 
(3) the failure of contextualists to distinguish between 
different levels of interpretation, or to take into account 
evidence showing that perception is largely independent 
of high level cognitions such as theories and beliefs, so 
that as Marshall (2005) has put it, “the power of theories 
and beliefs to condition perception has firm limits” (p. 
187).
        Given that strong commonalities appear to 
exist (as in the common depictions of the process of 
awakening suggested in Taylor, 2016a, and in the 
transformational processes identified by Studstill, 2005, 
or the contemplative universals identified by Rose, 2016), 
I feel that the most valid way of explaining them is in 
terms of a common landscape of expansive experience—
or “the more expansive and inclusive world” described by 
James (1986, p. 428), or the common experiential core 
of Hood’s (2006) hypothesis—that is explored, viewed, 
and interpreted in different ways, by individuals who are 
both part of and outside spiritual traditions.
        To extend the landscape analogy, mystics and 
teachers of various spiritual traditions are the explorers 
of this psychological landscape. Because of their cultural 
and individual psychological differences, they explore 
it in different ways, following different routes, and they 
experience and encounter different aspects of it. So when 
they leave accounts or maps showing their journeys—as 
spiritual teachings or accounts of their experiences—the 
maps have a great deal of variation, but also show strong 
commonalities.
        Let me point out again that in my view it is 
not so important to consider whether this landscape 
is ontologically real. It is perhaps enough to treat it in 
psychological terms—that is, one should think in terms 
of ranges of potential psychological human experience, 
which appear to be accessible to all human beings, as 
aspects of the human psyche which may not be part of 
normal experience for most human beings, but which 
are may be uncovered in certain circumstances.
Metaphysical Issues
This leads me to the topic of metaphysics. One of the critical points raised by Hartelius is that, in the 
original paper, I addressed metaphysical issues while 
claiming not to be doing so. I agree that the metaphysical 
issues were not addressed with a great deal of clarity in 
the paper. In retrospect, I feel that I was more cagey 
about metaphysics than I should have been. So let me 
now try to express myself more clearly.   
        I did not intend to imply that the soft perennial 
model does not make metaphysical claims. One of the 
points I was trying to make was that it is perfectly valid 
for transpersonal psychologists to make metaphysical 
claims about the nature of reality, provided these are 
not wholly speculative or abstract. A distinction can 
be made between abstract or speculative metaphysics, 
and phenomenological or experiential metaphysics. 
Schopenhauer (2012) criticized Kant for creating a 
conceptual metaphysics rather than a metaphysics 
that was expressed in concepts—that is, for creating 
a metaphysics that was too abstract and speculative. 
According to Schopenhauer (2012), metaphysics 
should be empirical rather than merely rational, built 
on phenomenology rather than just on concepts. As 
he wrote, “It is true that universal concepts should be 
the material in which philosophy deposits and stores up 
its knowledge but not the source from which it draws 
its knowledge. … It is not, as Kant defines it, a science 
from concepts but a science in concepts” (p. 41, italics in 
original).
        Another example might be a religious 
metaphysical system that a person accepts through belief 
rather than experience (for example, when a person 
accepts the notion of God or heaven and hell through 
cultural transmission without actually having experience 
of them). I see Wilber’s perennialism as another example 
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of a metaphysics that is speculative and conceptual. This is 
the main issue I have with his model—that it is an overly 
conceptual metaphysical structure, based on his own 
interpretation of contemplative traditions, rather than 
one based on research or phenomenological evidence.
        Hartelius (2016) stated that “the claim that a 
pervasive spirit-force constitutes the essence of reality is a 
metaphysical assertion, whether or not Taylor intends it 
to be so” (p. 43). I agree that this claim is metaphysical; 
I also agree that it would be more accurately expressed as 
saying that, in expansive states of being, an all-pervading 
spiritual force may be a fundamental feature of human 
beings’ experience of reality, rather than a feature of 
reality itself. But my argument is that this is not an 
abstract and speculative metaphysical claim but one 
which is supported by some degree of phenomenological 
evidence. It is not wholly conceptual, as Schopenhauer 
complained of Kant, but to some degree evidence-based. 
This evidence includes anthropological reports, spiritual 
texts, poems, reports of spiritual experiences, and so 
on.  I accept that other researchers may interpret this 
evidence in a different way, but have attempted to make 
a case for my own perspective.
        In other words, as stated in the original article, 
I believe it is appropriate to consider metaphysical claims 
and ideas as long as they are based on phenomenology 
“rather than being based on abstract analyses of spiritual 
traditions or on theoretical speculation” (Taylor, 2016a, 
p. 32). Daniels (2005) has made a similar point, stating 
that “if metaphysics is to mean anything at all, it must 
be based on sound phenomenology” (p. 174).
        Nevertheless, one of the points I tried to 
put across in Taylor (2016a) is that transpersonal 
psychology should be primarily phenomenological, 
and only metaphysical in a secondary sense. (As noted 
in the original paper, Daniels [2005] has also stated 
this view.) So when I recommended that transpersonal 
psychology should move “away from metaphysics and 
theory towards a more phenomenological research-based 
approach” (Taylor, 2016a, p. 36) I did not intend to 
imply that transpersonal psychology should move away 
from metaphysics altogether, only that this should not 
be a major concern. As I wrote in the original paper, 
“If there are any metaphysical speculations to be made, 
they are secondary, deriving from this phenomenological 
analysis” (Taylor, 2016a, p. 19).
        For me as a researcher, metaphysics is not so 
important. As noted above, it is enough to consider that 
the landscape of potentially expansive human experience 
is a shared aspect of human psychology. One should 
consider what this might imply about the nature of 
reality—that is, the ontology it implies (Ferrer, 2002)—
but this should not be a paramount concern. This accords 
with Husserl’s (1963) view that, in the phenomenological 
examination of experience, the ontological existence of 
things was not so significant. That was the concern for 
natural scientists—for the phenomenologist, experience 
was paramount.
Dispensing with Metaphysics?
In any case, how can it be possible to move away from metaphysics entirely? How would it really 
be possible for transpersonal psychology to dispense 
with metaphysics, as Friedman (2013) has suggested? 
Hartelius (2016) has stated that “It is probably not 
possible to remove all metaphysical assumptions from 
any context, including science” (p. 44), but this seems to 
underplay the importance of metaphysical assumptions 
in forming interpretations, particularly with regard to 
science.
        It is impossible not to operate within some kind 
of metaphysical framework. Even if a theorist states that 
he or she is dispensing with metaphysical issues, there is 
still some form of metaphysical framework motivating 
their attitude to these issues, including the decision 
not to address them. This is an error often made by 
materialist scientists, and that is also made by Friedman 
(2013). Materialist scientists may believe that they are 
observing reality objectively, by focusing on hard facts, 
and disregarding any phenomena or idea that has not 
been empirically proven or that cannot be tested. But 
materialist science itself incorporates metaphysical 
assumptions. As Ferrer (2014) has put it, “Scientific 
naturalism is not only thoroughly metaphysical, but also 
arguably shaped by economic interests perpetuating an 
eco-pernicious, disenchanted worldview that imposes 
methodological blinders on transpersonal researchers” 
(p. 157). Scientific materialism is a belief system that 
holds that matter is the primary reality, and that all 
phenomena can be explained in terms of the interactions 
of particles of matter, or as epiphenomena of materialist 
interactions. The skeptical attitude of materialist 
scientists to such fields as spirituality and psychic 
phenomena is not an avoidance of metaphysics but the 
result of a materialist metaphysical paradigm. As many 
observers (for example, Habermas, 2008; Nagel, 2012) 
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have suggested, scientific materialism has many of the 
characteristics of religious dogmatism.
        As Ferrer (2014) has pointed out, Friedman 
(2013) has made the same error, believing that he is 
endeavoring to make transpersonal psychology more 
empirical by excluding “the transcendent” or “trans-
conceptual”— which he has defined as "anything 
that is supernatural and metaphysical” (p. 307). In 
principle, this would mean eliminating the study of 
psychic phenomena and nondual or transcendent states 
of consciousness. But in reality this simply means 
shifting transpersonal psychology into a different kind 
of metaphysical paradigm—namely, that of scientific 
materialism. As Ferrer has put it, “turning the field 
into a modern scientific discipline effectively binds 
transpersonal psychology to a naturalistic metaphysical 
worldview that is hostile to most spiritual knowledge 
claims” (p. 152).4
        Hartelius (2016) has made a similar error of 
conflating metaphysics with the unscientific by stating 
that “a more common contemporary understanding 
is that metaphysics refers to subjects that cannot be 
examined scientifically” (p. 43). What exactly does 
science mean in this context, and how can it be free of 
metaphysical claims itself? Hartelius’s own notion of what 
science is stems from his own underlying metaphysical 
paradigm. It is impossible for any perspective to be 
outside of metaphysics. Hartelius has rightly suggested 
that researchers should be aware of their own underlying 
metaphysical assumptions, but  it is not clear whether he 
has heeded this advice himself.
        In an especially helpful article, Marshall (2014) 
has suggested seven possible explanatory positions 
in relation to mystical experience, which may be 
associated with different metaphysical positions. These 
are (1) mystical perennialism; (2) radical diffusionism; 
(3) mystical essentialism (which is related to mystical 
aspectism); (4) mystical mediationism; (5) radical 
contextualism (as espoused by Garside [1972] and Katz 
[1978]); (6) post-modern relativism; and finally (7) 
neuroscientific reductionism. Marshall’s point is that 
scholars usually adopt at least one (and possibly more 
than one) of these explanatory paradigms, even if they 
are unaware of doing so. As he has written, “It is far better 
to bring metaphysics out into the open than let it operate 
surreptitiously in the background” (p. 11).
        So which paradigm—or paradigms—should 
transpersonal psychology include? Rejecting all forms 
of perennialism or essentialism, the metaphysics of 
Hartelius and Friedman appear to be varied combinations 
of diffusionism, contextualism, and post-modern 
relativism, with hints of neuroscientific reductionism.
        The distrust towards metaphysics of Friedman 
and Hartelius is reminiscent of the philosophical field 
of logical positivism, which held that only statements 
descriptive of sense experience were meaningful. 
Metaphysical statements were meaningless because they 
could not be reduced to statements about sensation, and 
so could not be verified via the senses. In this way, logical 
positivists attempted to reduce philosophy to a narrow 
discipline centered round logic and language. Is it really 
possible that a similar reductive agenda can be applied 
to transpersonal psychology? Should the field really try 
to exclude metaphysical claims (although of course this 
is actually impossible in any case) and nondual states? 
If so, the question must be asked: At what point does 
transpersonal psychology cease to be transpersonal? At 
what point does one take the trans out of transpersonal? 
At what point does the field cease to be transpersonal 
and simply become equivalent to positive or cognitive 
psychology?  
        In any case, such attempts to limit the range of 
transpersonal psychology are actually based on a false 
dichotomy between the scientific and unscientific. This 
attitude is based on the view that such nonmaterial 
phenomena as metaphysical ideas and nondual states 
of consciousness are unscientific because they are 
unfalsifiable. Hartelius (2016) has exemplified this 
simplistic binary position by suggesting that Wilber’s 
metaphysics is invalid because he “has made an 
unfalsifiable claim about the ultimate nature of reality” 
(p. 43). Hartelius has rejected the concept of nondual 
consciousness because it is “an unfalsifiable assertion 
about the foundational nature of reality—and as such 
it is a metaphysical assertion” (p. 44). He has suggested 
that phenomena are only validly scientific when they are 
testable and falsifiable. Everything else is metaphysical 
and therefore of questionable validity.
        However, in the contemporary philosophy 
of science, it is generally recognized that it is far too 
simplistic to make a distinction between falsifiable science 
and unfalsifiable metaphysics (and other unscientific 
disciplines such as Marxism or psychoanalysis). As Kelly 
(2015) has summarized, “philosophers of science now 
generally reject Popper’s arguments for the universal 
primacy of falsification over confirmation” (p. 499). 
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Kelly has pointed out that the importance of falsification 
in historical scientific practice has been massively over-
estimated, and that scientific theories generally cannot 
be proved or disproved, but gain credence by gradually 
accumulating evidence over time. Most scientific 
advances are the result of confirmation of bold theories 
rather than falsification (Chalmers, 1979; Kelly, 2015). 
        It is certainly debatable whether Popper's 
falsification criterion can be applied to social sciences. 
Metaphysical theories may be evaluated according to 
other criteria, such as internal consistency, subsumptive 
power, and attention to data. In other words, falsification 
is certainly not the only quality by which metaphysics 
should be evaluated. Metaphysical theories do not 
become invalid simply because they cannot be falsified. 
It is therefore impossible to draw a line between the 
scientific and unscientific (Tauber, 2009; Ferrer, 2014).
        So to return to the question: What metaphysical 
paradigms should transpersonal psychology include? 
Should the field accept a quasi-materialist framework, 
some combination of contextualism and neuroscientific 
reductionism, a Wilberian perennial-structuralist 
framework, or Ferrer’s participatory model (depending 
on whether this is seen as a metaphysical model 
or not)?5 I would argue that it is valid to include a 
phenomenologically (rather than philosophically) 
oriented soft perennialist or essentialist model. Since 
diffusionist, radical contextualist, and neuroscientific 
explanations are inadequate, I believe this is the most 
satisfactory way of explaining the commonalities of 
expansive states of being both across religious traditions 
and outside them (such as the common aspects in 
depictions of awakening noted in Taylor [2016a], or 
the similarities identified by Studstill [2005] and Rose 
[2016]).
        However, this does not mean I am suggesting 
that this should be the only paradigm. It is surely 
acceptable for transpersonal psychology to include a 
variety of metaphysical perspectives. One of the virtues 
of the soft perennialism described in Taylor (2016a) 
is that it offers a great deal of room for variety and 
plurality, as with Ferrer’s participatory philosophy. I 
agree with Ferrer (2014), who has stated that, “the field 
should not be defined or limited by its allegiance to any 
single inquiry approach, epistemology, or metaphysical 
worldview” (p. 153). (This relates to the issue of 
inclusiveness, which I will address in the last section of 
this paper.)
Possible Research Bias
Let me briefly address the third criticism Hartelius (2016) made of my original paper (Taylor, 2016a): 
I do not show enough awareness of how my own biases 
and beliefs could influence my research findings. 
Although I only included a very short summary of my 
research in the original paper, I agree that I did not 
emphasize this. It is impossible for any researcher to 
be unaffected by their own biases and beliefs, and it 
is important to introduce measures to provide greater 
validation. In my own case, I am aware that my own 
perspective is influenced by my own background of non-
traditional spiritual experiences, and in particular, my 
personal experiences of becoming aware of a spiritual 
force apparently pervading phenomena, and space itself 
(see note 2). Perhaps if I had a background in traditional 
religion, or was more strongly associated with particular 
contemplative traditions, then my perspective would be 
different.
        This is an issue I have become more aware of in 
recent years, and have tried to mitigate. For example, in
a recent study of 90 awakening experiences (Taylor 
& Egeto-Szabo, 2017) the reports were analyzed by 
myself and another researcher (whose background 
was in conventional psychology and who had little 
knowledge of transpersonal psychology, or of my own 
work) independently, for greater validation. I have also 
recently completed a research project on ongoing states 
of wakefulness originally triggered by bereavement, in 
which the thematic analysis has been conducted by an 
independent researcher (the same individual mentioned 
above), to reduce possible bias. The latter study also 
includes quantitative measures (including the Inventory 
of Secular/Spiritual Wakefulness mentioned earlier—
which has itself of course undergone a rigorous process 
of validation).
        One of the points I tried to make in Taylor 
(2016a) is that both ongoing states of wakefulness 
and temporary awakening experiences have the 
same fundamental characteristics when they occur 
both within and outside the context of spiritual 
traditions. These characteristics, I suggested, include 
heightened awareness or intensified perception (or a 
process of increasing and intensifying awareness), an 
increased sense of connection (or a movement beyond 
separateness towards connection and union), reduced 
cognitive activity with less identification with thoughts 
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(a process of cultivating inner stillness and emptiness), 
and enhanced well-being (Taylor, 2016a).
        Whilst acknowledging the likelihood that my 
research findings were affected to some degree by my 
intentions and biases, it is important to remember that 
these findings are by no means just my own. In effect, 
my findings replicate many others. There is a large 
amount of research showing that both temporary and 
ongoing experiences of expansive states of being can 
occur outside a traditional spiritual context, with very 
similar fundamental characteristics. This evidence is 
particular strong in relation to temporary experiences, 
as was seen above in relation to cross-traditional studies 
using Hood’s M-Scale. Similar evidence has been found 
amongst the thousands of experiences collected by 
the Religious Experience Research Unit (based at the 
University of Wales), the research of individuals such 
as Greeley (1975), Robinson (1977), Hardy (1979), 
Hay (1987), and Hoffman (1992), as well as the earlier 
research of figures such as Johnson (1960) and Laski 
(1961).
        In terms of ongoing expansive states, it is 
significant that my findings were very similar to those 
of Miller and C'de Baca (2001), who interviewed more 
than 50 individuals reporting a sudden and permanent 
psychological transformation. Miller and C’de Baca 
termed this transformation quantum change and described 
it as “a vivid, surprising, benevolent, and enduring 
personal transformation” (p. 4), which can be so sudden 
that it “break[s] upon consciousness like a forceful wave” 
(p. 39). Miller and C’de Baca identified two different 
types of quantum change– the mystical and the insightful. 
The characteristics of the former are very similar to the 
characteristics of traditional mystical experiences, with 
the difference that they became established as permanent 
traits: a noetic quality, a sense of unity, transcendence 
and awe, a deep sense of well-being, and a deeper sense of 
spirituality (Miller & C'de Baca, 2001). Significantly, as 
in my research, a strong association was found between 
this transformation and intense psychological turmoil; 
more than half of the incidences of quantum change 
were related to intense unhappiness, trauma, or tragedy.
        My findings were also very similar to studies of 
the after effects of near-death experiences. Research has 
repeatedly found that many of those who have near-death 
experiences undergo a permanent transformation into a 
more expansive state of being, including characteristics 
such as intensified perception, an increased sense of 
connection to nature, an increased capacity for love and 
compassion, reduced interest in material wealth and 
personal success, a heightened sense of meaning, a new 
spiritual outlook, and a reduced fear of death (Moody, 
1975; Grey, 1985; Fenwick & Fenwick, 1995; Sabom, 
1998; Van Lommel, 2006; Sartori, 2015).
        Both the research into the after-effects of near-
death experiences, and Miller and C’de Baca’s (2001) 
research into quantum change, illustrate that a shift into 
a more expansive state of being can occur in exceptional 
circumstances, in reaction to intensely traumatic 
events that appear to dissolve a person’s ordinary self-
system. This seems to enable a new, higher-functioning 
self-system to emerge, with a much more expansive 
awareness in phenomenal, conceptual, subjective, and 
intersubjective terms (Taylor, 2017). There is a sense of 
moving beyond limitations into a more intense, deeper, 
and wider reality—that is, into what I described as a 
more expansive experiential landscape (Taylor, 2016a), 
or the “wider world of meaning” identified by James 
(1986). Significantly, both in near-death research and in 
Miller and C’de Baca’s (2001) research, many individuals 
have undergone this shift outside the context of spiritual 
traditions, without any prior interest in spirituality or 
any experience of spiritual practice.
        Studies of post-traumatic growth provide similar 
evidence. Typical characteristics of post-traumatic 
growth include a greater sense of appreciation, a stronger 
sense of connection to nature and other people, a stronger 
sense of meaning and purpose, a more accepting attitude 
to death, and a greater interest in spirituality (Cryder, 
Kilmer, Tedeschi, & Calhoun, 2006; Stanton, Bower, 
& Low, 2006). Particularly in its most intense form, 
post-traumatic growth shares many commonalities with 
a shift into a more expansive state of being, as described 
in the above research. This similarity is reflected in my 
use of the term post-traumatic transformation for cases 
of sudden shifts into a more expansive state of being in 
my research, when they occur in the context of intense 
psychological turmoil (Taylor, 2012, 2013, 2016b).
        In effect, the findings of Miller and C’de 
Baca (2001), and research into the after-effects of near-
death experiences, and cases of post-traumatic growth, 
add support to my argument that there is a common 
landscape of expansive psychological experience which 
can be explored outside the context of spiritual traditions. 
In other words, they could be seen as offering further 
support to the essentialist or soft perennial perspective.
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        As noted above, I agree that this claim is 
influenced by my own perspective and experiences. 
Others may look at the same data and reach different 
conclusions. Further research on expansive experiences 
or states outside the context of spiritual traditions may 
help to clarify matters.
The Nature of Scholarly Debate
Finally, I would like to comment on the tone of Hartelius’s response to my article (which was, 
unusually, published in the same issue as my original 
article). I found the tone of the article hostile and 
adversarial—for example, when he wrote that the 
“primary contribution [of my essay] is to illustrate that 
its particular approach is wholly unworkable and shows 
no future promise” (Hartelius, 2016, p. 42). There was 
also the insinuation that I have misused my academic 
credentials by popularizing ideas based on shoddy 
scholarship. As he wrote,
It is unfortunate that Taylor's ideas were not vetted 
more carefully before being disseminated as a 
popular book. Those with advanced degrees, and the 
credibility these degrees confer, have a responsibility 
to educate their public readers carefully, rather than 
using public forums to advance ideas that may be 
appealing to a popular audience but lacking in the 
soundness that might give them enduring value. (p. 
46)
        In actual fact, this hostile tone is familiar from 
some previous discussions within the transpersonal 
community. Anderson (2015) has recently commented 
on the nature of such debates, and I think her points are 
worth quoting at length:
In transpersonal psychology, there have been far too 
many combative, even vitriolic, “debates” among 
individuals historically identified with the field. 
Controversy itself is fine and healthy for any field 
but attack is not. Anyone who has been in the field 
of transpersonal psychology for a decade or so is 
aware of many long-standing controversies. Not 
only do these hostilities divide the transpersonal 
community, but professionals outside transpersonal 
psychology have noticed that we do not always 
“walk our talk.” That is, we do not always live up to 
the spiritual values we promote and that duplicity 
undermines our public credibility. (p. 165)
I agree with Anderson that transpersonal psychology 
needs to adopt a much more inclusive approach. Of 
course, scholarly debate should be rigorous, but there 
has been a tendency of some transpersonal psychologists 
to aggressively smite down any views which disagree 
with their own, which suggests an inability to accept a 
plurality of different viewpoints. It is disappointing that 
some transpersonal psychologists seem to be fighting 
over territory, and disputing over their different visions 
of the field. This is an issue that many of my students of 
transpersonal psychology have picked up on, and which 
is often (in my experience) remarked on at conferences, 
usually with an air of concern and confusion. If there 
is any discipline which should be pluralistic, it should 
surely be transpersonal psychology. Even though I have 
a very different perspective to Hartelius, I have respect 
for his ongoing contributions to the field, including his 
diligent editorship of this journal—and I hope that he 
has some respect for my own contributions.
Conclusion
In this article, I have attempted to provide a wider range of evidence for a perennialist or essentialist 
perspective from more contemporary sources, making 
it clear that this approach is far from outmoded, and 
providing further evidence for my assertion that there 
is a landscape of expansive psychological experiences 
that precedes interpretation by spiritual traditions. 
My advocacy of a more phenomenological approach 
to perennialist perspectives appears to be mirrored 
by approaches by some contemporary scholars of 
mysticism. These approaches are more nuanced and 
sophisticated, and more pluralistic and contextualist, 
than earlier hard perennial approaches, and as such they 
could be considered forms of soft perennialism. (Note 
again that some scholars—such as Marshall (2005) 
and Rose (2016)—have used the term essentialism to 
refer to experiences and transformative practices and 
outcomes, reserving the term perennialism in reference 
to teachings or doctrines. In this sense, I am advocating 
essentialism).
        I have also tried to clarify the metaphysical 
aspects of soft perennialism, at the same time as 
highlighting flaws in Hartelius’s own attitude to 
metaphysics. I believe that transpersonal psychology 
should be open to essentialism, and at the same time 
address metaphysical issues and make metaphysical 
claims, as long as these are evidence-based and as long as 
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they emerge from (and are secondary to) phenomenology. 
The phenomenological evidence that I feel supports my 
model—and a perennialist or essentialist perspective in 
general—includes the commonalities of cross-traditional 
reports of mystical experiences and of depictions of the 
process of awakening, similarities with accounts of near-
death experiences and accounts of post-traumatic growth, 
and examples of individuals who have experienced 
expansive states (both temporarily and on an ongoing 
basis) outside the context of spiritual traditions. At 
the same time, I have argued that other attempts to 
explain these commonalities and similarities—such as 
radical diffusionism, contextualism, or neuroscientific 
reductionism—are inadequate.
         Additionally, the inadequacies (and the 
contradictions) of a pseudo-empirical scientific attitude 
(which is itself bound to a form of metaphysics) should 
be acknowledged. It is short-sighted—and outmoded—
to decide that certain experiences or concepts should be 
disregarded or regarded as invalid or suspect because 
they are unfalsifiable or untestable. This would deprive 
transpersonal psychology of some of its most interesting 
and potentially important data. From this point of view, 
it is perfectly acceptable for transpersonal psychology to 
address metaphysical issues, paranormal phenomena, 
and nondual states.
        To move away from this reductionist agenda 
would not only harmonize transpersonal psychology 
more with recent developments in other fields, but also 
ensure that the field remains as pluralistic as possible. 
Although advocating an essentialist approach, I believe 
there should be room for a wide variety of different 
perspectives and methodologies, with an integrative 
openness and pluralistic outlook which should remain, 
as Lancaster (2013) has written, “the defining feature of 
transpersonal psychology” (p. 225).
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Endnotes
1.   Ferrer (2017) has recently written a critique of my 
“soft perennialism” as an appendix to his book, 
Participation and the Mystery. His evaluation is 
generally positive and respectful—for example, he 
has written that “I find much of value in S. Taylor’s 
proposal even beyond its fundamental points of 
convergence with the participatory approach” 
(Ferrer, 2017, p. 264) and that “soft perennialism 
should be regarded as an important advance in the 
ongoing perennialist/participatory dialogue” (p. 
272). However, Ferrer (2017) has also highlighted 
three specific shortcomings of my approach in the 
light of his participatory philosophy. These are 
(1) intra-subjective reductionism, (2) privileging 
an “essential” spiritual force over metaphysical 
depictions of that force (this creating a hierarchical 
framework,) and (3) possibly falling prey to a form 
of the “myth of the given.” These are salient points 
that I will respond to at a later date.
2.   Whitman is one of the best examples of a “natural 
mystic.” His experience of the world was intensely 
pantheistic, with a strong sense of a spiritual force 
pervading both all phenomena and his own being. 
Whitman was highlighted by Bucke (2017) as a case 
of “cosmic consciousness,” and by Maslow (1994) as 
an example of a “self-actualized” person. Although 
influenced by Emerson and the transcendentalist 
movement, Whitman’s form of mysticism was 
highly idiosyncratic, and unrelated to any particular 
spiritual tradition. He certainly never followed any 
spiritual tradition, nor any conventional spiritual 
practice. In his later years, Whitman did develop 
some familiarity with Indian philosophy but 
apparently not any deep or detailed knowledge. 
When Henry David Thoreau met Whitman, he 
remarked that Leaves of Grass was “wonderfully like 
the orientals.” Thoreau asked Whitman if he had 
read oriental works, and he replied, “No, tell me 
about them” (in Cowley, 1973, p. 919).
        Once Eastern spiritual texts became more 
widely available, many observers noticed parallels 
with Whitman’s work, and sought evidence that 
he was influenced by them. However, as the 
literary critic Cowley (1973) remarked, “What is 
extraordinary about this Eastern element is that 
Whitman, when he was writing the poems of 
the first edition [of Leaves of Grass] seems to have 
known little or nothing about Eastern philosophy. 
It is more than doubtful that he had even read the 
Bhagavad-Gita, one of the few Indian works then 
available in translation” (p. 972). (This evidence 
includes the absence of any references to Indian 
texts in Whitman’s preparatory notebooks, despite 
references to many other books.) Rather, as Cowley 
suggests, Whitman’s wakefulness seems to have 
been completely natural and spontaneous (see 
Taylor, 2017, for a fuller discussion on Whitman.)
        A similar but lesser known “natural mystic” is 
the mid-19th century British nature writer Richard 
Jefferies, who almost certainly had no knowledge of 
Eastern spiritual traditions or religious mystics. As 
the mystical scholar Happold (1986) wrote of him:
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  He found that “eternal now” of which the 
mystics had spoken. He reached a doctrine of the 
“nobility of the soul,” which is akin to Eckhart and 
Sankara. Though the only idea of God with which 
he was acquainted was that of the religion of his 
own environment, in his condition of a “deity” 
beyond “deity” he tried to express in fumbling 
words what Eckhart and Rysbroeck had expressed 
so much more adequately in the distinction they 
drew between the Godhead and God. (p. 385)
3    I should also mention my personal perspective here. 
At the age of around 16, I began to experience 
unusual states of being, in which I would be filled 
with a powerful sense of inner well-being and 
a sense that the world around me was alive and 
filled with meaning. I was often awestruck by the 
beauty and vividness of things. I felt drawn to 
quiet natural spaces, where I felt a powerful sense 
of harmony. I felt that I was deeply connected 
to the world around me and that there was a 
connection between the phenomena around me, 
as if they were expressions of a something greater 
than themselves. However, at the time, I did not 
understand these experiences. My background 
was secular, with no religion or spirituality at all. 
I only began to understand the experiences when, 
at the age of 22, I impulsively bought a book 
called Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology by F.C. 
Happold (1986), from a local bookshop. The book 
had a revelatory effect on me. I saw my experiences 
reflected in it. I read passages from The Upanishads 
and The Bhagavad-Gita and related strongly to 
their descriptions of Brahman pervading the 
world, illuminating it and bringing all things into 
oneness. I read excerpts from the writings of non-
traditional mystics such as Richard Jefferies and 
strongly identified with their experiences. So from 
this point on I had a framework to make sense of 
my experiences.
  I am therefore a good example of a person 
who experienced expansive states of being outside 
the context of—and without knowledge of—
spirituality, but who nevertheless had spiritual 
experiences, in line with the view that the 
psychological landscape of expansive states of 
being exists beyond and prior to interpretation by 
spiritual traditions. This personal background has 
undoubtedly influenced my perspective.
4.   Another issue with Friedman’s (2013) argument is 
his contention that “transcendent” states cannot 
be investigated scientifically because scientific 
investigation relies upon a duality between subject 
and object. However, to move beyond subject-object 
duality does not necessarily mean that the subject 
ceases to exist, or ceases to be capable of observation 
or knowledge. This confuses individuation with 
separation. The subject can still be individuated at 
the same time as existing as part of a greater whole, 
in the same way that a wave can exist as a form in 
its own right at the same time as being one with 
the whole ocean. (Meister Eckhart repeatedly stated 
that, even in the deepest states of mystical union, 
a tiny spark of individuality remained [Kelly & 
Grosso, 2007]). The knower and the known do not 
have to be separate for knowledge to arise. In fact, 
one could say that to participate in the whole as a 
subject facilitates a deeper level of knowing, since 
it entails more intimate knowledge, authentic gnosis 
rather than the superficial intellectual knowledge 
that comes from external observation. In reality, 
it is only conventional materialistic science that 
implies that knowledge depends upon a duality 
between object and subject. Moving beyond duality 
contravenes that model, but not necessarily science 
itself.
    In addition, the movement beyond duality is 
one of the primary and most common principles 
of contemplative traditions (Taylor, 2016a), and it 
could be argued that the study of such “transdual” 
states is one of the primary historical aims of 
transpersonal psychology (since transpersonal 
literally means “beyond-self”.) And so a field that 
excluded the study of such states would hardly merit 
the term “transpersonal.” 
  Note that I have used the term “transdual” rather 
than “transcendent.” From the perspective of “soft 
perennialism” the concept of “the transcendent” 
holds little relevance, since spirit is seen as 
immanent and all-pervading. Spiritual development 
is not seen in terms of transcendence but in terms 
of expansion. Expansive ranges of experience are 
not transcendent but simply an extension and 
intensification of normal awareness. And in fact, 
this accords with the perspective of many spiritual 
traditions. As Ferrer has put it, “While Friedman’s 
portrayal of the transcendent may be consistent 
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with certain apophatic mysticisms (Sells, 1994), 
it is by no means inclusive of the variety of ways 
in which supernatural realities have been enacted, 
understood, and described” (2014, p. 158). Although 
some traditions speak of a neumonal absolute (for 
example, the Ein sof of the Kabbalah, which cannot 
be experienced in its pure form, although it emanates 
through the material world), this certainly does not 
apply to Daoism or the many schools of Tantra, for 
example. Most traditions—even Christian mystical 
traditions—do accept the possibility of direct 
experience of an ultimate referent (Ferrer, 2014).
5. The question of whether Ferrer’s Participatory 
Spirituality can be considered a metaphysical 
framework is an interesting one. Ferrer has 
claimed not, partly because what he has called 
“the mystery” is undetermined, which neutralizes 
potential metaphysical biases, and also because of 
participatory spirituality’s plurality and its emphasis 
on “pragmatic values” rather than universal or 
objective ones. However, in Taylor (2016a) I 
discussed Ferrer’s concept of the “mystery” in relation 
to its similarity to the concept of an all-pervading 
spiritual force. I concluded that it was impossible to 
judge this due to the intentional vagueness of Ferrer’s 
depictions. In a similar way, Ferrer’s insistence on 
the “undetermined” nature of the mystery could be 
construed as a reluctance to, in Marshall’s words, 
“bring metaphysics out into the open” (2014, p. 11). 
In any case, when Hartelius described participatory 
philosophy as suggesting, for example, that 
“consciousness in some form penetrates through all 
physicality” (Hartelius, 2015, p. 26) it is difficult to 
see how, as a metaphysical claim, this differs much 
from my description of all-pervading spiritual force. 
Other aspects of participatory philosophy’s view of 
the world—for example, as a dynamic open-ended 
system with no duality between subject and object, 
and the human mind and the natural world being of 
the same nature (Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013) —could 
surely also be construed as metaphysical claims.
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